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Abstract 
  The paper presents a model of household labour supply that allows for simultaneous decisions of household 
members, complex and non-convex choice sets induced by tax and benefit rules, and quantity constraints on hours 
choice. The model is estimated using the 1993 Bank of Italy’s Survey of Household Income and Wealth, and used to 
simulate three hypothetical tax reforms: namely, a flat tax and two versions of a negative income tax system, under the 
constraint of equal tax revenue. All the reforms produce a larger household average disposable income, without 
worsening much the equality of the income distribution, and are supported by a majority of winners in the sample, 
although the proportion of winners varies considerably across income deciles. We also simulate the impact on labour 
supply and income of removing the quantity constraints on hours-wage packages available on the market, constraints 
that in Italy typically make full-time jobs more easily available than other jobs. The results show a considerable increase 
in participation among women belonging to relatively poor households, and a slight reductions in hours worked – given 
participation – across all households. 
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1. Introduction 
  In this paper we present a microeconometric model which features simultaneous treatment 
of both spouses' choices; exact representation of income taxes and quantity constraints on the 
distribution of hours. Previous structural analyses of labor supply in Italy based on microdata have 
been carried out for example by Colombino and Zabalza (1982), Colombino (1985), Colombino and 
Del Boca (1990), Del Boca and Flinn (1984) and Rettore (1990). Most of these studies are based on 
local samples. None of them develops a truly simultaneous model of partners’ decisions. Taxes are 
either ignored or given a simplified representation. 
  For the estimation and the simulation we use the data from the 1993 Bank of Italy’s Survey 
of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW93). The analysis is restricted to married couples, with 
both partners in the age interval 18-54. Self-employed and retired persons are excluded. Household 
decisions must therefore be interpreted as conditional on not being self-employed nor retired. 
   We run the model to simulate the labor supply responses and welfare effects of replacing the 
current (1993) tax system (on personal incomes) with hypothetical alternatives, namely a flat tax 
and two versions of a negative income tax, under the constraint of equal tax revenue. 
  The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the model. Sections 3 and 4 describe 
the empirical specification, the data used and the estimates. Section 5 presents the results of various 
policy simulations. Section 6 is dedicated to the final remarks. 
2. The model 
  Our study draws upon the framework introduced by Dagsvik (1994) and may be viewed as 
an extension of the model in Dickens and Lundberg (1993). Models similar to the one applied here 
to Italy have also been estimated for Sweden (Aaberge et al. 1990) and Norway (Aaberge et al. 
1995). Our approach to modeling labor supply is rather different from the traditional one, originally 
adopted in a well-specified microeconometric framework by Heckman (1974). A version of the 
traditional model that also included taxes was later estimated by Hausman and co-authors for the 
U.S. (Hausman (1980, 1981 and 1985), Burtless and Hausman (1978), Hausman and Ruud (1984)), 
and also adopted in numerous other studies (e.g. Blomquist (1983) for Sweden, Arrufat and Zabalza 
(1986) for the U.K., Kapteyn et al. (1990) for Holland, Colombino and Del Boca (1990) for Italy). 
  The traditional approach is essentially based on the standard textbook model. The agent’s 
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where  
h = hours of work 
w = wage rate 
I = other (exogenous) income 
T = total available time 
C = disposable income. 
  In this model the wage rate w is fixed. Given the wage, a job is just described by a value of h 
belonging to the interval [0,T]. The individual is free to choose any value of h in that interval. The   3
set of “jobs” in the (h,w) space among which the individual is assumed to choose under this 
traditional approach is represented in Fig. 1. 
 
Fig. 1 approximately here 
 
  Under standard regularity conditions, if we define h(w,I) as the value of  h which solves 
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 The  solution  h
*is typically a random variable, due to some unknown preference parameter 
that is treated as random.  
  When taxes are introduced, the budget constraint in problem (1) becomes  ) , ( I wh f C = , 
where f is the function, which transforms gross income into net income. In most countries, f defines 
a piece-wise linear budget, with each segment k defined by a net wage rate wk (the slope) and a 
“virtual” income  Ik (the intercept of the extension of the segment). The solution can be easily 
characterized in terms of the functions h(wI kk , ) 
1. In principle, this approach can be generalized to 
any type of tax system that can be approximated by a piece-wise linear tax rule, and to simultaneous 
decisions of household members. In practice it may become prohibitively burdensome for complex 
rules f and for the decisions of a married couple. Therefore the analyses based on this approach tend 
to rely on some simplified representation of the tax rule and on some recursive structure of 
household decisions. It seems also very unrealistic to assume that for each individual there is just 
one market wage and that hours can be freely chosen in the interval [0,T] 
2. 
  The approach that we follow here assumes that the agents choose among jobs, each job 
being defined by a wage rate w, hours of work h and other characteristics j. As an example of j, 
think of commuting time or specific skills involved in the job. For expository simplicity we 
consider in what follows a single person household, although the model we estimate considers 
married couples
3. The problem solved by the agent looks like the following:   
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 The  set  B is the opportunity set, i.e. it contains all the opportunities available to the 
household. For generality we also include non-market opportunities into B; a non-market 
opportunity is a “job” with w = 0 and h=0. Agents can differ not only in their preferences and in 
their wage (as in the traditional model) but also in the number of available jobs of different type. 
Note that for the same agent, wage rates (unlike in the traditional model) can differ from job to job. 
As analysts we do not know exactly what opportunities are contained in B. Therefore we use 
probability density functions to represent B. Let us denote with  ) , ( w h p the density of jobs of type 
). , ( w h By specifying a probability density function on B we can for example allow for the fact that   4
jobs with hours of work in a certain range are more or less likely to be found, possibly depending on 
agent’s characteristics; or for the fact that for different agents the relative number of market 
opportunity may differ. Fig. 2 illustrates a possible opportunity set in the (h,w) space as represented 
in this approach.  
 
Fig. 2 approximately here 
 
  From expression (3) it is clear that what we adopt is a choice model; choice, however, is 
constrained by the number and the characteristics of jobs in the opportunity set. Therefore the 
model is also compatible with the case of involuntary unemployment, i.e. an opportunity set that 
does not contain any market opportunity; besides this extreme case, the number and the 
characteristics of market (and non-market) opportunities in general vary from individual to 
individual. Even if the set of market opportunities is not empty, in some cases it might contain very 
few elements and/or elements with bad characteristics. 
   
  We assume that the utility function can be factorized as 
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 The  term  ε  is a random taste-shifter which accounts for the effect on utility of all the 
characteristics of the household-job match which are observed by the household but not by us. We 
observe the chosen h and w. Therefore we can specify the probability that the agent chooses a job 
with observed characteristics (h,w). It can be shown that under the assumptions (3), (4) and (5) we 
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  Expression (6) is analogous to the continuous multinomial logit developed in the 
transportation and location analysis literature (Ben-Akiva and Watanatada, 1981). The intuition 
behind expression (6) is that the probability of a choice (h, w) can be expressed as the relative 
attractiveness – weighted by a measure of “availability” p(h,w) – of jobs of type (h, w). 
  From (6) we also see that this approach does not suffer from the complexity of the tax rule f. 
The tax rule, however complex, enters the expression as it is, and there is no need to simplify it in 
order to make it differentiable or manageable as in the traditional approach. The crucial difference 
is that in the traditional approach the functions representing household behavior are derived on the 
basis of a comparison of marginal variations of utility, while in the approach that we follow a 
comparison of levels of utility is directly involved. 
 
   5
3. The empirical specification 
 
  In order to estimate the model we choose convenient but still flexible parametric forms for V 
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where the subscripts F and M denote female (wife) and male (husband), C = f(wh,I) is household 
net (disposable) income, N is the size of the household, Ak is the age of gender k, CU6 and CO6 are 
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  For the purpose of estimating the model, we find it convenient to write the density of hours 
and wages p(h,w) as follows: 
0
0
(, )  i f  (, ) 0
(, )





=  −= 
 8. 
where g(h,w) is the conditional density of (h,w) given that (h,w) > 0, and go is the probability density of 
market opportunities in the opportunity set, i.e. the proportion of market jobs in the opportunity set. 
  We assume that hours and wages available to the husband and hours and wages available to 
the wife are independent
6: 
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where g1k and g2k denote the marginal probability functions respectively of hours and wages, for 
gender k. 
Hours in the opportunity set are assumed to be uniformly distributed with a peak in the 
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where πk is the full-time peak for gender k, and 3432 is the maximum number of hours observed in 
the sample 
7. 
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  The proportions of market opportunities g0F and g0M are assumed to depend on whether 










1 1 exp( )
,
µµ
,     12. 
 
where REk = 1 if the household is living in Northern Italy, REk = 0 otherwise. Note that a positive 
(negative) value of the coefficient of RE means that living in Northern Italy increases (decreases) 
the proportion of market opportunities in the opportunity set. 
  The density of offered wages is assumed to be lognormal with gender specific means that 
depend on length of schooling and on past potential working experience, where experience is 
defined equal to age minus length of schooling minus six. Thus, the wage equations are given by 
M F k EX EX S w k k k k k k k k k , , ) ( ) log(
2
3 2 1 0 = + + + + = ξ β β β β  13. 
          
where Sk = years of education, EXk = years of potential experience and ξ k is a random variable i.i.d. 
normal. 
 
4. Data and estimation 
  The estimation of the model is based on data from the 1993 Survey of Household Income 
and Wealth (SHIW93). This survey is conducted every two years by the Bank of Italy and besides 
household and individual socio-demographic characteristics, contains detailed information on labor, 
income and wealth of each household component. 
  The labor incomes measured by the survey are  net of social security contributions and of 
taxes on personal income. Therefore, in order to compute gross incomes we have to apply the 
"inverse" tax code. In turn, the “direct” tax code has to be applied to every point in each 
household’s choice set to compute disposable income associated to that point 
8. 
  Hourly wage rates are obtained by dividing gross annual wage income by observed hours. 
  Only married couples with at least one of the partners working in the wage employment 
sector are included in the sample used for estimation and simulation. Couples with income from 
self-employment are excluded from the sample: this is due to the assumption that their decision 
process may be substantially different from wage-employees' and typically involves a permanent 
element of uncertainty
9.  
  We have restricted the ages of the husband and of the wife to be between 18 and 54 in order 
to minimize the inclusion in the sample of individuals who in principle are eligible for retirement, 
since the current version of the model does not take the retirement decision into account.  
  Due to the above selection rules, the estimates and the simulations should be interpreted as 
conditional upon the decisions not to be self-employed and not to retire for both partners. The 
sample covers 2160 households. Tab. 1 contains the descriptive statistics of the variables used.  
   7
Tab. 1 approximately here 
 
  The parameters appearing in expressions (7) and (10)-(13) are estimated by maximum 
likelihood. The likelihood function is the product of the choice densities (6) for every household in 
the sample. The estimates are reported in Tab.2 and Tab.3. Note that the opportunity set of the 
model is infinite. In order to overcome the computational problems that can arise in estimating 
models with very large (or even infinite) opportunity sets, McFadden (1978) has suggested a 
procedure that approximate exact ML estimation and provides consistent estimates. The method 
essentially consists in representing the true opportunity set with a sample of weighted alternatives, 
with the weighting depending on the sampling scheme. As a first step we estimate empirical 
univariate densities for the variables () M F F M h h w w , , , . We then draw 199 values from these densities 
and build 200 alternatives (adding the observed choice). In expression (6) every term V( )p( ) is 
weighted, i.e. divided, by the previously estimated density of the corresponding alternative
10.  
  Overall, the parameters are measured with good precision and their magnitude and sign 
seem to conform qualitatively to what could be inferred from economic reasoning or previous labor 
supply estimates. More novel and hard to compare to other research results are the estimates of the 
market opportunity density and hour’s density. The market opportunity density estimates imply that 
market opportunities are relatively more abundant in northern regions. For example using (12) we 
can compute that the density of market opportunities is 4.3 times larger in northern regions for 
males, and 1.5 times for females. Also the full-time peaks of the hours density are very important. 
The estimates imply that 73% of the jobs available to males and 70% of the jobs available to 
females require at least 1846 hours. 
Tables 2 and 3 approximately here 
5. Policy simulations 
  Once the parameters have been estimated, we can simulate the effects of different policies. 
A policy can be defined as the introduction of a new opportunity set B* and /or of a new tax rule f*. 
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As a practical matter, the simulation procedure works as follows. First, for each household we 
simulate the opportunity set, which – as in the estimation procedure - contains 200 points: one is the 
chosen alternative, the other 199 are built by drawing from the estimated p(h,w) density (or from a 
different density in case the policy is defined also by a change in the opportunity density). Second, 
for each household and each point in the opportunity set we draw a value ε  from the distribution 
(5). Third, for each household we solve problem (14). The whole procedure is repeated 10 times, 
and the results are averaged across repetitions. The results of the policy simulation are uncertain 
both because they are based on uncertain parameters (estimation uncertainty) and because they also 
rely on simulated opportunity sets and simulated stochastic components of the utility functions 
(simulation uncertainty). In the Appendix we present a decomposition of total uncertainty into its 
estimation and simulation components. 
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5.1. Tax reforms 
  There is an increasing concern in Italy for the efficiency and distribution performance of the 
tax and benefit system. By and large we can identify two focal areas of interest. One is centered on 
the possible merits of a flatter profile of the tax rates, as an instrument to reduce distortions and 
incentives to tax evasion 
11. The other focuses upon a restructuring of the policies in favor of low-
income groups, possibly switching from a system essentially based on implicit in-kind transfers and 
categorical benefits to a system based to a larger extent upon means-tested income transfers 
12. 
Although interesting, this discussion is lacking support from appropriate measurement of the effects 
of the policies that are proposed. The models used by default are "static" microsimulation models, 
which do not account for behavioral responses
13. In this matter, however, we think that behavioral 
responses and incentive effects are the crucial points. 
  The first four sections of Table 4 report the results of the simulation of different personal 
income tax regimes, namely: the current (1993) regime, a flat tax and two versions of a negative 
income tax regime. The hypothetical reforms are connected to the above mentioned discussion since 
the flat tax is an extreme and simple way to reduce distortion costs and the negative income tax is a 
general, means-tested, way to support the poor.  
  The simulation of the model with the actual tax rules (as of 1993) is used to give us the 
base-case predictions of participation rates, annual hours of work (given participation), gross 
earnings, gross family income, taxes and disposable income. The marginal tax rates applied in 1993 
are as follows: 
 
Income (1000 LIT)  Marginal tax rate (per cent) 
Up to 7,200  10 
7,200 – 14,400  22 
14,400 – 30,000  27 
30,000 – 60,000  34 
60,000 – 150,000  41 
150,000 – 300,000  46 
Over 300,000  51 
 
  Besides the application of the basic marginal tax rates, the tax system envisages other tax 
rates for special categories of income, deductions from taxable income, tax credits and family 
benefits. All the details of the tax-and-benefit system are accounted for in the model 
14. 
  In the second simulation the actual taxes are replaced by a flat tax (FT) on total income. The 
flat tax rate is determined so as to yield constant total tax revenue. 
  In the third and fourth simulations we replace the actual taxes by a negative income tax 
(NIT). For a household with N members, let us define the guaranteed household income G(N) as: 
  
m N a N G ) ( ) ( σ =  15.   
           
where  1 0 ≤ ≤ a , m is the average per capita disposable income in the total sample and σ(N) is given 
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  The tax R is then given by 
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where t is a marginal (constant) tax rate and Y is total household gross income. The tax is negative 
if total gross income is less than G. Otherwise the tax is a fixed proportion t of the part of income 
exceeding G
15.  
In the simulations shown here we set m = 13473  (1000 ITL), a is alternatively set equal to 
0.5 or to 0.75 and t is determined so that total tax revenue in the sample is constant. According to 
the definition used in Commissione di Indagine sulla Poverta’(1985) the term γ (N)m is the poverty 
threshold for a household with N members. Therefore we simulate a system where household 
income is supported up to 1/2 (or alternatively, 3/4) the poverty threshold, if necessary; otherwise, 
income exceeding the poverty threshold is taxed at a constant marginal rate equal to t. 
In interpreting the following results of reform simulations, it should be kept in mind that 
what we are using is just a supply model. We assume that the opportunity densities remain 
unchanged, while of course one might argue that they would change too as a consequence of a new 
tax regime
16. 
  Table 4 indicates that the effects on labor supply of the two tax-reforms are modest but not 
irrelevant. Note that the average tax rate paid by the household in 1993 was 0.20. A shift to a FT (t 
= 0.184) increases the labor supply of men and women, in particular poor women who are predicted 
to participate more in the labor market and to work longer hours, given participation. A shift to a 
NIT produces an increase of aggregate supply in the (a = 0.5, t = 0.234) version, and a decrease in 
the (a = 0.75, t = 0.284) version, with very modest variations in both versions.  
  All the reforms would produce a significantly larger disposable income for the households. 
Together with the fact that aggregate hours of work do not increase much, this provides a rough 
indication that the reforms might be efficient although disequalizing when income inequality is 
measured by the Gini coefficient
17.  
  There is one apparently counter-intuitive result in Table 4, which provides a good example 
of the possibly different implications of our model as compared to the traditional approach. Since 
the flat tax  (18.4%) is higher than the first marginal tax under the 1993-system (10%), we might 
expect a decrease in participation rates. This is even more valid of the negative income tax system, 
which introduces a guaranteed minimum income coupled with a 23% or alternatively 28% flat tax. 
Our model predicts instead an increase in aggregate supply as a consequence of the shift to a FT(t = 
0.184) or to NIT(a = 0.5, t = 0.234) system.  A traditional model would assume that every value of 
h is equally available in the choice set; moreover, given preferences, the utility associated to a 
particular point in the choice set would be uniquely determined by (h,w). Under these assumptions a 
traditional model would indeed predict a decrease in participation rates under either reform. In the 
model presented in this paper, however, not every value of h is equally likely to be available in the 
choice set.  Job opportunities offering less than 1846 or more than 2106 hours are relatively   10
unlikely to be found. The opportunities in the range 1846-2106 may carry lower tax rates under 
both reforms than under the 1993-tax code. Thus participation may become more attractive. 
Moreover, in our model the utility is random; there are unobserved components attached to every 
market or non-market opportunity which make it more or less desirable. Thus a market opportunity 
may turn out to be more desirable than a non-market opportunity (non-participation) even though 
the opposite is true when the comparison is made solely in terms of hours and disposable income.  
  There is another result that deserves a comment. When NIT(a=0.75, t=0.284) is applied, 
aggregate labor supply is slightly reduced. Still, aggregate net income increases, despite the fact that 
the opportunity densities and tax revenue are invariant by construction. More generally, in all the 
reforms, average gross income increases far more than labor supply. How does this happen? It must 
be that the least productive, those with lower wages, reduce (or increase less) their supply, and at 
the same time the most productive, those with higher wages, increase (or reduce less) their labor 
supply. So it seems that the reforms interact in a virtuous way with the pattern of elasticities, 
inducing a sort of favorable selection process. 
The Gini coefficients displayed in Table 5 suggest that the distribution of income (both 
gross and net) would be made slightly more unequal as a consequence of the introduction of any of 
the reforms, more markedly so for the flat tax. Note however that NIT (a=0.75, t=0.28) is more 
effective in redistributing than the 1993 tax rule, and its disequalizing effect on the distribution of 
net income is very small. 
In Tab.6 we give the fraction of winners for deciles of the distribution of household 
disposable income. A household is a winner if the utility level reached under 1993 system is lower 
than the utility level reached after the reform. This procedure of course bypasses the problem of 
inter-household welfare comparison
18.The results show that the majority of the households would 
support all the three reforms, with a more robust majority for NIT (a=0.5, t=0.23). Behind this 
almost uniform result, we observe that the effects of the reforms differ dramatically across deciles. 
No reform receives a majority support in all deciles, although NIT (a=0.75, t=0.28) gets close to it, 
which suggests that some careful design of a NIT system might be supported by a diffuse majority 
across the deciles, and possibly even reach a higher degree of equality in view of the results of 
Table 5. It is also interesting to note that NIT (a=0.75, t=0.28) would be supported in a referendum 
both by the poorest and by the richest income decile. Of course a definite judgement upon the 




Table 4 approximately here 
 
5.2 Labour market reforms: removing hours constraints. 
  Constraints limiting the choice of the number of hours worked appear to be very important. 
Given the estimates of α 18 and α 19 reported in Table 2, we can compute that the percentage of jobs 
available in the hours range (1846, 2106) is 49% for females and 54% for males. In this section we 
report the results of a simulation exercise consisting in removing these constraints: namely we 
simulate household behaviour after replacing the hours density specified in expression (14) with a 
uniform density. 
In the last section of Tab.4 we report the results of removing the constraints on the 
distribution of hours in the opportunity set. For each individual we impose to every individual a 
strictly uniform hours opportunity density, so that, given the wage, any value of hours is equally 
available in the interval [0, 3432]. The opportunity set of every individual is also adjusted in order 
to keep fixed the average amount of hours per job available in the opportunity set (including non-
market opportunities. This can be done by adjusting  gok so that the above condition is met. The tax   11
regime is kept as in 1993. From Tab. 4 we observe that aggregate participation rates are very close 
to the reference case. This probably reflects the above adjustment that introduces a sort of 
invariance of the “average” opportunity available. We note however that females belonging to 
households in the lower deciles of the reference-case income distribution increase their participation 
to the labour market: in the first decile in particular the participation rate doubles, from 14.4% to 
28.8%. On the on the hand, in richer households females tend to reduce their participation rate. 
From the next two columns of Tab. 4 we observe that by removing hours constraints, that is 
reducing the dominance of full-time jobs relative to other types of jobs, reduces supplied hours 
among females belonging to the upper deciles of the pre-reform income distribution. This is the 
result that one would expect. The rigidity of the Italian labour market seems to have forced, in 
particular women in the “richest” deciles, to work longer hours than they would prefer. Moreover it 
seems that women in the lowest deciles of the income distribution have been prevented by hours 
constraint to participate. For many of these women it may be hard to combine the care taking of 
children, for example, with working on a full-time job. By making jobs with shorter hours more 
easily available on the market, the burden of combining market work and other activities at home is 
reduced. It should be noted that women living in households belonging to the lowest deciles of the 
income distribution are not necessarily poor in the sense of having a low potential wage rate: they 
might be poor not because of a poor market potential but because they find it hard to combine 
market work and other activities. 
It is interesting to observe that the tax revenue does not change much after removing hours 
constraints, in fact it increases slightly. Since this happens together with a reduction of the total 
amount of worked hours, it must be the case that the post-reform labour force is more productive 
than before: the average wage rates of those who are working is higher and/or those with higher 
wages work more and those with lower wages work less with respect to the pre-reform regime. So 
there appears to be a favourable selection effect similar to the one we already noted in the previous 
section when commenting tax reforms. 
From the last row of Tab. 5 we also observe that with uniformly distributed hours, the 
distribution of gross household income becomes more unequal, despite the fact that household 
income is increased in poorest deciles. This must be due to changes in the intra-decile distribution. 
Table 5 approximately here. 
 
6. Conclusions 
    We have developed a model of household labour supply that adopts an econometric 
framework of the continuous multinomial logit type and allows for complex non-convex budget 
sets, highly nonlinear labor supply curves and imperfect markets with institutional constraints  
  Policy simulations indicate that less distortionary tax systems such as a flat tax or a negative 
income tax system would have modest but not irrelevant impacts on aggregate labor supply and on 
the distribution of disposable income among married couples. The reforms contain incentives to 
work less for some and to work more for others. The incentive to work more seem to prevail at least 
for two of the reform, and the supply elasticity is large enough to induce a significant increase of 
average household disposable income. There is also some indication that the reforms activate a sort 
of favorable selection process, by inducing the more productive to work more and the less 
productive to work less. The results suggest that the reforms might be efficient but slightly 
disequalizing. A majority – although not a large one - of households would support the reforms. The 
proportion of winners varies widely across the deciles, depending on the reform. There is some 
indication that a careful design of a NIT-like system might attain an improvement in both efficiency 
and equality, and possibly also get a majority support in all the deciles. Thus a more systematic 
search of the reform-space looks promising. We have also simulated a policy consisting in   12
removing the quantity constraints on hours choice, i.e. imputing to every household an opportunity 
set with uniformly distributed hours. The most noteworthy results are the increase in participation 
of women in the poorest income deciles and the decrease of hours worked by women in the richest 
deciles. Thus the results of this reforms reveal that the low participation rates of women in poor 
households is due at least in part to the difficulty of combining market work and other activities at 
home, given that part-time jobs are hard to find. On the other end, women in the richer households 
can probably substitute “home production” time with income (market goods); however, if given the 
opportunity, at least some decide to switch to part-time.   13
 
Appendix 
  For some of the variables of interest, we have conducted the simulation in a more complex 
manner than explained in section 5. Namely, the procedure of section 5 is repeated for 10 different 
values of the parameter vector, randomly drawn from the estimated joint distribution (multivariate 
normal). This allows to account not only for simulation uncertainty but also for estimation (or 
parameters) uncertainty. Estimation uncertainty stems from the sampling variability of the estimated 
parameters. Simulation variability is due to the fact that we do not observe all the relevant variables 
affecting the preferences and the constraints: we do not observe ε nor do we observe the exact 
choice sets, and we are therefore forced to simulate them. This more complex simulation procedure 
is very time consuming and the results that we report in what follows are just suggestive of a more 
systematic investigation that we plan to complete in a future contribution. For a certain variable X 
we can define XPR as the value obtained with parameters P in repetition R, with P=1,…,10 and 
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The definition of  EST V , the variance imputable to estimation uncertainty, and of  SIM V , the 
residual variance imputable to simulation uncertainty, is based on the standard analysis-of-variance 
decomposition. Table 7 illustrates the results of the simulation of the 1993 tax regime.  
   14
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics −−−−  Married couples 
 Mean St.dev. Min.  Max.
Individual variables:   
Annual hours of work (unconditional)   
  Husband  1 990 507 0  3640
  Wife  742 893 0  3640
Annual hours of work (conditional)   
   Husband  2017 453 130  3640
   Wife  1640 538 108  3640
Participation rates   
  Husband  0.99 0.12 0  1
  Wife  0.45 0.49 0  1
Hourly wage rates (1000 LIT)   
  Husband  16.7 9.8 0.3  121.1
  Wife  16.0 8.8 1.8 111.1
Gross annual earnings (1000 LIT)   
  Husband  32691 1912 0  185998
  Wife  11228 14424 0  69195
Age   
  Husband  41.3 7.5 22 54
  Wife  39.4 7.8 18  54
Education (years)   
  Husband  9.7 3.9 0  19
  Wife  9.4 4.0 0 19
Experience   
  Husband  27 9 4 48
  Wife  24 9 4 48
Household variables:   
Annual net taxes paid (1000 LIT)  11 026 10172 -5042  82623
Gross annual income (1000 LIT)  55 090 32831 1529  264907
Disposable annual income (1000 LIT)  44 064 23244 3000  198932
Region (North)  0.32 0.47 0  1
Number of children below 6  0.34 0.58 0  3
Number of children 6-15  0.58 0.73 0  3  17
 
Table 2. Estimates of the parameters of the utility function 
Variables Parameters  Estimates  t-values 
Consumption 
α 1  0.728  12.8 
    Constant  α 2  1.470 8.5 
    Household size  α 3      -0.103  3.7 
Husband’s leisure  α 4   -12.763 -14.7 
    Constant  α 5   -1.408 -1.3 
    log age  α 6   0.760 1.2 
    log age squared  α 7   -0.097 -1.1 
Wife’s leisure  α 8   -8.012 -10.3 
    Constant  α 9   74.509 3.3 
    log age  α 10   -41.708 -3.3 
    log age squared  α 11  5.880 3.3 
    # children below 6 years old  α 12  0.302  2.4 
    # children 6 or above 6 years old  α 13  0.277 2.7 
   18
Table 3. Estimates of the market opportunity, hours, and wage densities 
  Parameters Estimates  t-values 
Market opportunities density:     
  Wife      
    Constant  µ 0F  -0.796 -8.4 
    Region  µ 1 F  0.631 6.2 
  Husband      
    Constant  µ 0Μ   -2.412 -10.9 
    Region  µ 1M  1.821 2.9 
Hours density:      
  Wife       
    Full-time peak  π F  11.670 27.3 
  Husband      
    Full-time peak  π M  14.454 50.5 
Wage density:      
  Wife      
    Constant  β0F  0.888 8.7 
    Education  β1F  0.101 24.2 
    Experience  β2F 0.027 3.6 
    Experience squared  β3F -0.224×10 -1.4 
  Husband      
    Constant  β0M 1.212 15.1 
    Education  β1M 0.074 25.3 
    Experience  β2M 0.024 4.4 
    Experience squared  β3M -0.154×10 -1.6   19
Table 4. Participation rates, annual hours of work, gross income, taxes and disposable income 
(1000 ITL) for couples under alternative different tax regimes and labour market reforms by 
deciles of household disposable income in 1993. Means. 
 











   F M F M  Households 
 I  14.1  95.6  1030  1571  15221  525  14695 
 II  20.0  97.6  1209  1832  24372  2109  22263 
1993 tax-rules  III 43.8  98.9  1546  1991  48187  8960  39227 
 IV 65.5  99.4  1731  2117  85135  19983  65152 
 V  74.4  99.4  1828  2237  128396  34365  94032 
 VI 43.7  98.6  1590  1972  54525  11074  43150 
 I  19.6  95.4  1264  1706  22933  4219  18714 
 II  24.4  97.8  1397  1924  31761  5845  25917 
FT (t=0.184)  III 44.7  99.0  1585  2048  54142  9961  44181 
 IV 64.5  99.0  1741  2162  89459  16460  72999 
 V  73.2  99.5  1834  2267  132888  24452  108435 
 VI 45.0  98.6  1623  2036  60189  11074  49115 
 I  16.5  95.3  1165  1617  19348  1435  17912 
 II  21.7  97.5  1345  1873  28979  4244  24735 
NIT (a=0.5, t=0.23)  III 43.4 98.8 1562  2027  52147  9727  42420 
 IV 64.1  99.3  1739  2155  88449  18256  70193 
 V  72.9  99.5  1834  2261  131752  28445  103307 
 VI 43.6  98.5  1608  2009  58141  11074  47067 
 I  14.4  95.3  1056  1551  16404  -1952  18356 
 II  19.9  97.1  1240  1820  26199  2537  23662 
NIT(a=0.75,t=0.28) III 41.4  98.6 1540 1996  49801  9538  40263 
 IV 63.3  99.2  1733  2138  86985  20218  66767 
 V  72.6  99.5  1832  2252  130581  32714  97867 
 VI 41.9  98.3  1589  1976  55897  11074  44823 
 I  28.8  96.3  1071  1612  22776  2994  19782 
 II  35.7  98.2  1178  1849  32080  4812  27269 
Removing III 44.0  98.6  1274  1983  49647  9895  39752 
hours constraints  IV 53.8  98.8  1403  2095  77416  18082  59334 
 V  57.9  99.0  1526  2189  110989  28832  82157 
 VI 44.0  98.4  1307  1966  54115  11409  42706 
Note to Table 4  I   = first decile  
II  = second decile  
III = third to eight decile  
IV = ninth decile  
V  = tenth decile  
VI = whole sample   20
 
Table 5. The Gini coefficient for distributions of households gross and disposable income, and 
degree of redistribution under various tax regimes 




1993 tax-rules  0.323  0.283  0.875 
FT (t=0.184)  0.332  0.332  1.000 
NIT (a=0.5, t=0.23) 0.338  0.315  0.935 
NIT (a=0.75, t=0.28) 0.343  0.298  0.869 
Removing hours constraints  0.352  0.307  0.872 
 
Table 6. Decile-specific proportions of winners from two alternative tax reforms, by household 
disposable income in 1993. Per cent 
Tax reform  Deciles of the distribution of household disposable income in 1993 
1993 tax-rules  1  2  3-8  9  10  All 
FT (t=0.184)  14.2 19.0 51.3 86.5 90.6 51.8 
NIT (a=0.5, t=0.23) 45.9 29.9 50.7 76.5 83.3 53.9 
NIT (a=0.75, t=0.28)  74.1 43.7 44.8 51.1 64.9 50.2 
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M (Mean)  1960  98.7 704  44.1 43700 
Total 
uncertainty: 
     
VTOT  357.39 0.04  618.75 0.82  461824.11 
Std. Err. of M  1.9 0.02  2.5 0.09  68.3 
MINTOT  1927  98.2 672  42.3 41998 
MAXTOT  2001  98.9 772  45.8 44603 
Estimation 
uncertainty: 
     
VEST  345.96 0.03  590.49 0.81  450357.21 
MINEST  1929  98.3 677  42.6 42154 
MAXEST  1998  98.9 764  45.4 44406 
Simulation 
uncertainty: 
      
VSIM  11.43 0.01  28.26 0.01  11448.90 
MINSIM  1958  98.6 698  43.8 43520 
MAXSIM  1962  98.8 712  44.4 43890 
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Fig. 1 The opportunity set in the traditional approach
h
w
T 0  23
Fig. 2
The opportunity set in our model approach (the numbers represent













                                                 
1 A very useful and clear exposition of the ”Hausman approach” is given by Moffit (1986). 
2 A critical analysis of other aspects of the ”Hausman approach” can be found in MaCurdy et al. (1990). 
3 See Aaberge, Colombino and Strøm (1998) for the extension to married couples as decision units. 
4 Expression (6) amounts to assuming that ln(ε ) is distributed according to type I extreme value distribution.  
 
5 For the derivation of the choice density see Aaberge, Colombino and Strøm (1999). 
6 The assumption of independence of h and w is standard in microeconometric labor supply studies, where the 
traditional approach dictates a constant wage rate for any amount of hours of work (an exception is Moffit, 1984). In 
our model it is essentially a computational simplification 
7 Alternative ways to account for constraints on hours are represented by Ham (1982), Colombino (1985), Ilmakunnas 
and Pudney (1990), Kapteyn et al. (1990), Dickens and Ludberg (1993) and van Soest (1994). 
8 Dino Rizzi (University of Venezia) provided us with a program (TBM), written by him, which allows to apply detailed 
tax-benefit rules to gross incomes and also to recover gross incomes from net incomes by applying the inverse rule. 
9 We are currently working on a version of the model that includes the wage-employment / self-employment choice. 
10 Examples of this method of sampling a reduced choice set from previously specified densities, are provided by 
Atherton et a. (1990) and Colombino (1998). The discretization of the choice set for estimation purpose makes the 
empirical model somewhat close to the discrete multinomial logit estimated by van Soest (1994). The crucial 
differences are that in van Soest’s model the choice set is equal for everyone, and the wage is fixed across jobs, hours 
being chosen in a discretized interval [0,T]. 
11 See various contributions in Bernardi et al. (1995). 
12 See Commissione per l’analisi delle compatibilita’ macroeconomiche della spesa sociale (1997). The issues of the 
performance of the Italian welfare system and of the perspectives for reform are also discussed in Rossi (ed.) (1996). 
13 Interesting applications of non-behavioral microsimulation models to the analysis of recent Italian tax policies or 
proposals are represented for example by Rizzi (1995), ISPE (1997) and Bourguignon et al. (1997). 
14 To be more precise, the tax program that we use accounts for all the details for which the dataset is sufficiently 
informative. 
15 One can think of many different variants of NIT. See Fortin et al. (1993) for a theoretical and empirical analysis of 
NIT systems. 
16 The assumption that the opportunity densities remain unchanged is equivalent to assuming – in a traditional setting -
that the aggregate demand for labor is perfectly elastic. This is the case, for example, if the conditions for the so-called 
non-substitution theorem hold.      
17 The increase of average household disposable income is of course due to the household behavioral response. No such 
effect would be there in a non-behavioral simulation. Under the constraint of equal tax revenue, if household behavior 
remains unchanged, also average gross income and average net income should remain unchanged. Note that most part 
of our behavioral effect comes from (female) participation elasticity, which is probably a robust enough concept even 
for those who do not particularly trust behavioral and structural modeling.   
18 Aaberge et al. (1998a) perform an analysis of policy reforms based on interpersonally comparable welfare measures. 
19 We are currently working on the application of appropriate procedures for the social evaluation of reforms (Aaberge 
et al., 1998a). 